Open-end real estate funds are of particular importance in the German bank-dominated financial system. However, recently the German open-end fund industry came under severe distress which triggered a broad discussion of required regulatory interventions. This paper gives a detailed description of the institutional structure of these funds and of the events that led to the crisis. Furthermore, it applies recent banking theory to openend real estate funds in order to understand why the open-end fund structure was so prevalent in Germany. Based on these theoretical insights we evaluate the various policy recommendations that have been raised.
Non technical summary
Open-end real estate funds perform a substantial liquidity transformation: While the largest part of their portfolio is invested into long-term illiquid assets, they issue shares that are redeemable on a daily basis at a prespecified rate which is only sluggishly adapted to price changes of the underlying assets. This liquidity transformation exposes funds to substantial liquidity risk and makes them susceptible to liquidity crisis.
In Germany a major part of the real estate funds are open-end. In December 2005 and January 2006 a credibility crisis spread to the whole industry leading to a severe liquidity outflow from those funds. This crisis episode stipulated a discussion about the necessity of regulatory changes limiting the liquidity transformation further and improving the transparency of those funds. This paper gives a detailed description of the institutional structure of open-end real estate funds in Germany and of the events that led to the crisis. Furthermore, the paper applies recent banking theories analyzing the liquidity transformation and liquidity risks of banks to open-end real estate funds and uses those insights to assess the various policy recommendations that have been raised. The paper argues that even though open-end real estate funds' liquidity transformation increases their vulnerability it might improve overall efficiency, because it increases investors' liquidity insurance. Moreover, the liquidity transformation might serve as an effective incentive device improving the performance of the funds' managers. Thus restraining substantially the liquidity transformation of those funds could be welfare reducing. In contrast, the proposed discount on the redemption of large share holdings is likely to be welfare enhancing. It not only increases funds' scope to provide liquidity insurance, it also reduces the institutional investors' arbitrage opportunities that often lead to unexpected large scale liquidity outflows. The suggested shortening of the evaluation periods for funds' real estate portfolios on the one hand improves funds' stability because it also limits arbitrage opportunities. On the other hand, it certainly reduces the scope of funds to intertemporally smooth asset price shocks. The recommended increase in evaluation experts' independency as well as the fostering of solicited ratings improves funds' transparency and thereby reduce the risk of herding driven runs. In addition, greater transparency reduces the need for liquidity transformation as an indirect disciplining device for the funds' management. However, unsolicited rating might only serve as a coordination device among investors and increase the risk of self-fulfilling liquidity crisis. Nichtselbstinitiierte (unsolicited) Ratings, bei denen der Ratingagentur keine weitere Information zukommt, dienen dagegen u.U. lediglich als Koordinationsmöglichkeit zwischen den Anlegern und erhöhen so die Risiken sich selbst erfüllender Liquiditätskrisen. *
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
Offene
Introduction
Open-end real estate funds are indirect real estate investment vehicles that are of particular importance in Germany.
1 Shares are directly backed by the properties and liquid assets held by the fund. In contrast to a closed fund structure, an open-end investment fund continuously creates new shares on demand. Investors can buy shares at net asset value from the fund and may redeem them on a daily basis at the prevailing net asset value, which can be higher or lower than the initial price at which the investors bought.
Consequently, even though shares are typically not traded on a secondary market, they are a highly liquid investment. (Little, 1992) .
In Switzerland the first open-end real estate fund was founded as early as 1938.
Switzerland was also one of the first countries to introduce a regulation for open-end property funds in 1967. Facing irregularities with redemption prices in 1991, the authorities adapted the regulations codified in the "Anlagefondsgesetz"(AFG). According to these criteria, redemptions are only possible after a notice of termination within a twelve months period before the end of the fiscal year (art. 42 AFG). This requirement should ensure that the fund management has enough time to acquire sufficient liquidity if necessary. On the other hand, the depository bank has to organize a continuous trade of shares, in general by trading on the stock exchange. As a result of the new regulations, most of 4 Of course, selling shares and buying them back after a short time period always involves transaction costs. However, in the situation described above the expected price drop outweighed transaction costs, making such a strategy profitable despite the involved costs. 5 See Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993) , Helmer (1997) and Lee (2000) for more details. In addition, different elements of the investment practice and valuation process also improved funds' resilience against liquidity crisis even if they were not initially implemented for that reason. One such element is the offering charge of usually 5% which becomes due on buying a share of an open-end real estate fund. Originally designated for covering distribution costs, these built-in transaction costs create an effective barrier to reduce the attractiveness of frequent transactions and thereby limit arbitrage opportunities. Furthermore, due to the offering charge, the necessary investment horizon to achieve a positive return increases to at least one year on average.
7 As emissions only take place occasionally, Hoesli (1993) refers to these funds as "semi closed-end". 8 For a further description of the institutional framework of German open-end funds see Maurer and Sebastian (2002) , Maurer (2004) and Maurer, Reiner, and Rogalla (2005) .
Another important aspect that represents a somewhat unique feature of the German funds' design relates to the process of evaluating the funds' assets. While financial assets are valued according to their market prices, the value of each property in the fund's portfolio is based on an appraisal by experts. Under the Investment Companies Act, the funds are required to have their property assets valued by an independent panel of experts each time they acquire or sell a property. Additionally, the whole portfolio has to be evaluated on a rolling basis every 12 months. Hence, the appraisal of the funds' properties takes place at different dates during the fiscal year, which results in a staggered valuation process. As a consequence, the effect of a change in asset values on the redemption prices is smoothed and discrete jumps in the redemption rate creating arbitrage opportunities for investors are limited. Further smoothing is accomplished via the valuation methods. As has been emphasized by Maurer, Reiner, and Rogalla (2005) ,
property appraisals tend to lag movements in the property market and understate the true volatility of returns in the underlying property values. This may be the result of appraisal "anchoring" to previous evaluations, aggregation of information over time, and the use of valuation methods based on yield analysis instead of cash flows -a procedure which in general will be considered as hardly market-based. Along with the huge capital inflow of the last years, the investor structure has changed 9 See also Morgan (1998) 10 In Germany, apart from public open-end real estate funds also special property funds exist, which are designated for a limited number, i.e. up to 10, of institutional investors. These special funds are usually managed by the same investment companies that offer also public open-end property funds. 11 See also Maurer, Reiner, and Rogalla (2005) , who provide an in-depth analysis of the risk-return
profile of German open-end real estate funds.
Similar to the argument that Diamond and Dybvig (1983) develop for bank deposits, investors' demand for liquidity insurance might result from the fact that, by the time of their investment decision, investors do not know exactly when they will actually need their funds back. Risk-avers investors will therefore prefer an investment product that provides them with comparably smooth repayments irrespective of whether they redeem their funds early or late. By holding parts of the portfolio in liquid but less profitable assets, open-end real estate funds can promise a rather high redemption in the short-run at the expense of returns to long-term investors which remain below the average long-term yield on pure property investments. Thus, ex-post those investors that happen to hold their shares relatively long implicitly cross-subsidize the higher short-term repayment to those investors that turn out to require their funds back earlier. Since funds' share holders are assumed to be risk avers, this liquidity insurance is ex-ante appreciated by investors and is welfare enhancing.
Following the argument of Qi (1994) , originally developed for the case of bank deposits, the costs of this liquidity insurance obviously decline if the fund can expect additional liquidity inflow in the short-run from issuing new shares. The fund then needs to hold fewer liquid and low-return assets as insurance against the expected early redemption of impatient investors. Still, the costs of this liquidity insurance to long-term investors, i.e.
the implicit cross-subsidy paid by long-term investors, are apparently increasing in the average fraction of investors redeeming their fund shares early. Put differently, the shorter the average holding period of fund shares, the lower is the average return that these funds can promise.
The increased engagement in property funds by institutional investors who used openend real estate funds as a substitute for money market funds to store liquidity, dramatically reduced average investment horizons in these property funds. The higher short-run yield that institutional investors realized in these open-end property funds as compared to money market investments were essentially borne by small investors with generally longer investment horizons. This undermined the efficiency of the liquidity insurance provided by these funds.
The staggered adjustment of the redemption rates to changes in the market value of the property held by the fund also enabled open-end real estate funds to offer an intertemporal smoothing of asset price shocks to its long-term investors. Following the mechanism described by Allen and Gale (1997) for the banking industry, the staggered adjustment of the redemption rate allows open-end property funds to build up reserves in times of increasing asset prices. These reserves can be used to stabilize the redemption rate above the market value of the fund's underlying assets in periods of declining asset prices.
Thus, given risk averse investors, the funds' ability to intertemporarily smooth shocks allows them to offer an additional efficiency enhancing insurance. 
Liquidity Transformation as Disciplining Device
Even though the liquidity insurance provision of open-end real estate funds might have contributed to the emergence of these investment products, it is unlikely that this has been the only factor. Particularly the observation that open-end property funds play a truly dominant role only in Germany cannot be explained by this universal efficiency gain.
A probably more convincing argument for the long-lasting success of open-end real estate funds in Germany can be made with regard to the disciplining role involved with this financing instrument. This argument is based on the idea that redeemable claims serve a control function, an idea that can be traced back to Fama and Jensen (1983) . In banking theory particularly Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) emphasize that refinancing illiquid assets with liquid liabilities-like deposits-held by multiple investors can serve as a disciplining device for the bank management. The fragile structure due to the liquidity transformation allows the bank manager to credibly refrain from moral hazard. 12 This is due to the fact that each individual investor has an incentive to redeem his deposits as soon as he perceives any misbehavior of the manager.
If he withdraws his funds immediately, he receives the face value of his deposits. If he waits, in contrast, the bank might not be able to repay due to the manager's misbehavior. Moreover, knowing that many other depositors have the same incentive to withdraw, each investor can anticipate that the bank will run out of liquidity. If the bank has to liquidate long-term assets in order to satisfy depositors' demand, this will reduce the expected repayment of a depositor holding on to his claim even further. Thus, information about a misbehavior of the management serves as a signal for depositors to run which eventually forces the fund into default. Assuming that the manager is dismissed in the event of such a crisis and assuming that his benefits from misbehavior in the short-run are overcompensated by expected future benefits from being in office, he will try to avoid a crisis and refrain form moral hazard.
12 Similarly, Goodhart (1987) argues that the characteristic role of banks is that they-in order to reduce informational frictions-use fixed-term liabilities to refinance fixed-term lending with a repayment probability that is difficult to assess for outsiders. He also points out that this efficiency enhancing combination at the same time makes banks vulnerable to crisis and creates the need for a lender of last resort.
Similar to bank deposits in the argument of Diamond and Rajan (2001) , an openend fund's redemption guarantee serves as an efficient and timely disciplining device. In contrast to other control mechanisms, the liquidity transformation and the associated risk of a run does not presuppose sophisticated investors, who have to monitor the management of the fund -a time-consuming and difficult exercise because of the long-term horizon of investments and the complexities in evaluating real estate assets. Fund managers who anticipate the risk of a run will behave well accordingly, thereby giving investors no reason to run, even though in principle they have an informational advantage with respect to the fund's properties, which they otherwise could use to "hold up" investors. investors, consequently, is the option to withdraw funds on a short-term basis and hence to "vote" by feet.
However, real returns on properties are uncertain. It is therefore important to also take into account the possibility of return deteriorations that are not caused by misbehavior on the part of the fund's management. As has been shown by Diamond and Rajan (2000) for the capital structure of bank, in a world with uncertain returns on long-term assets the choice of a pure deposit refinancing might be too rigid.
13 Such a capital structure precipitates runs when real asset values fall even without opportunistic behavior on the part of the bank's management. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that it is therefore optimal for banks to partially finance with a softer claim, i.e. equity. Such a soft claim buffers the fund against exogenous shocks to asset values.
Because the open-end fund itself is a special asset pool funded solely by the investors' contributions, a softer capital structure cannot be achieved. Yet, exogenous shocks to the property returns can be smoothed by holding liquidity buffers. Such excess liquidity holdings help to survive situations in which the cash flow from property returns falls 13 See also Sebastian and Tyrell (2006) , who analyze the advantages of open-end real estate funds' liquidity risk based on Allen and Gale (1998) and come to similar conclusions.
short and the available liquidity is therefore insufficient to serve the usual and expected redemption of shares.
In addition, an implicit promise given by the bank-owner to the fund's share holders reduces the risk of runs due to asset deteriorations. Such a guarantee to provide liquidity assistance in an emergency has to be implicit, so that it can be waived in case of misbe-
havior. Yet, it provides a buffer against smaller shocks to the asset value. Furthermore, it has to be partial, because otherwise the disciplining function of runs and therefore the
advantage of the open-end construction would be lost. As a consequence, for larger asset price shocks the risk of fundamental based crises due to asset price deteriorations is still unavoidable.
Liquidity Crises -The Unintended Consequences of Liquidity Transformation
As has already become apparent in the previous section, shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for depository institutions, investors expecting severe withdrawals of funds will also anticipate that the financial intermediary may be forced to sell off long-term assets below book value in order to obtain additional liquidity.
Since these "fire sales" reduce future cash flows, investors must also anticipate that the redemption rate will drop, which decreases the value of their claims. Thus, investors expecting a large-scale withdrawal of fund shares have an incentive to redeem their units.
Consequently, anticipating a strong amount of withdrawal from other investors, each individual investor will rationally withdraw his money as well, thereby vindicating the initial belief on which his action was based. One of the main disadvantages of the theory on self-fulfilling crises is its inability to predict which of the two equilibria will be realized. In order to fill this explanatory gap, it has been argued that market participants may coordinate their actions according to so-called sunspots, i.e. unrelated events that may lead investors to believe one of the two outcomes to be more probable than the other. Recent analytical work on coordination games has shown, however, that investors' behavior is not necessarily only influenced by unpredictable sunspots. Rather, their behavior is crucially affected by the structure of information about the fundamental value (in our case, about the fund's assets) that they dispose of. Referring to the results of the literature on "global games" 15 , it has been shown that investors' behavior is predictable, i.e. they choose a uniquely optimal strategy even for intermediate fundamental values, if they possess very precise private information, 14 Of course, this mechanism works in both directions, i.e. if an investor believes that other investors are not going to redeem their shares, this reduces his incentive to do so, thereby vindicating his initial belief because his behavior, in turn, reduces other investors' incentives to redeem their shares. 15 In a global game, players observe a noisy private signal about the game's payoff, which itself is determined by a random draw from a given class of games (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993) . In the case of open-end property funds, investors do not know their investment's payoff with certainty. Rather, they try to assess the payoff by taking into account any information that may be given to them. Additionally, their behavior itself influences the payoff since the probability of the fund's closure increases in the number of investors that withdraw their money. In this sense, the interaction between investors represents a "coordination game".
relative to the precision of publicly-available information (Morris and Shin (2002); Metz (2002) ). In this respect, public information is defined as pieces of information that are known to all investors and that are known to be known to all investors and so forth.
Hence, provided that investors' private information about the fund is sufficiently precise, the uncertainty stemming from self-fulfilling crises may be avoided. In this case, investors will redeem their shares only if the fund's fundamental value is perceived to be sufficiently bad. In any other case, investors will not be tempted to foreclose their investment only based on the anticipation that others will withdraw. In other words, there will not be a run that -in a self-fulfilling prophecy -leads to a closure of the fund without any fundamental cause. Furthermore, since the occurrence of a crisis can be predicted in this case, measures may be taken to prevent it. Due to the important role that public information plays, we may state that both the success and the demise of the market for open-end property funds seem to follow selfstabilizing paths. As long as the fund's shares are seen as profitable investments, for instance because of a successful development of the fund's share prices, this anticipation leads to even more capital inflows into the funds, thereby corroborating its stability. If, however, one fund is perceived to be distressed, this may be taken as a negative public 16 Note that a crisis event may still be inefficient, i.e. it might have been prevented had only sufficiently many investors decided not to redeem their shares. The difference to the purely expectations-driven liquidity crises lies in the fact that not all investors choose the same action, i.e. either all redeem their shares or no one does. Rather, the proportion of investors deciding on a withdrawal of money may lie between 0 and 1, but may still be inefficiently high relative to the fundamental value of the fund. These inefficiencies in run-equilibria have also been pointed out by Rochet and Vives (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) for the case of banking crises. However, a self-fulfilling liquidity crises will always be inefficient, a crisis result stemming from a unique equilibrium in a global game does not necessarily have to be inefficient.
signal about the general development of real estate assets, leading to severe outflows of capital, thereby in a contagious process endangering also other open-end property funds.
The fact that observations of other funds' success or failure are public information to investors and hence may strongly influence their behavior may both be strengthened or alleviated by the services of public information providers, such as rating agencies. We will return to this argument in section 6.
As already noted by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) an efficient measure to prevent selffulfilling liquidity crises is the suspension of convertibility of shares. However, this measure automatically cuts the disciplining effect that the full-redemption of shares exerts on the fund's management. As has already been mentioned above, it has to be weighed carefully therefore, which of the two risks is more severe: the risk of management-misbehavior or the probability of a run. In the latter case, we additionally have to distinguish between a fundamentally-caused liquidity crisis leading to the efficient closure of the fund, or a self-fulfilling crisis resulting in the closure of an otherwise viable fund. This distinction will be taken up again in the next section that describes the closure of the first open-end real estate fund in Germany, Deutsche Bank's Grundbesitz Invest. self-fulfilling crises -holds, the fund's demise took place within a rather uncertain market where a sunspot-event decided on the realization of the closure of the fund. According to global games theory, in contrast, the fund's freeze was the outcome of a unique equilibrium and had to be expected with certainty once the value of the underlying assets became known. Only in this respect could the crisis correctly be referred to as a fundamentaldriven event.
The Trigger of the Open-End Property Funds Crisis in Germany
In order to distinguish between the two theories, it is intriguing to examine more closely the information available to the market at the time the crisis happened. It might have been the case that the announcement of a revaluation of the fund's assets proved to be a sufficiently precise public signal to the market that the conditions for a selffulfilling crisis were satisfied, without the fund itself being of sufficiently low quality to warrant a "fundamental crisis". If this explanation holds, investors withdrew their money solely because they expected others to do so as well and not because they believed the fund's fundamental value to be sufficiently low. Hence, they coordinated on the inefficient action within a range of fundamental values where the efficient continuation of the fund would still have been possible. According to global games theory, in contrast, the observed closure of Grundbesitz Invest presents a fundamental crisis because investors held sufficiently precise private information about the fund that convinced them of the low value of the fund's assets. However, since finally after the reevaluation period the redemption price of Grundbesitz Invest shares was only reduced by 2.4 % when the fund was opened again on March 3rd, one may seriously doubt that the crisis was indeed driven
by private information about a fundamental weakness of the fund. A "fundamental" way of how an individual crisis may cause contagious effects is through its influence on real estate prices. In reaction to the liquidity shortage, the troubled fund has to sell off large parts of its real estate portfolio. This absorbs liquidity from the real estate market and depresses property prices. Similar to the channel of financial contagion in the banking sector pointed out by Gale (2004) and Fecht (2004) , this may trigger liquidity crises of other funds, since at each point in time some funds plan to raise liquidity in the market by selling parts of their real estate portfolio.
Systemic Repercussions of Individual Crises and the Role of Information
Given a severe drop in property prices, they will not be able to raise the expected amount of liquidity from these transactions. This might cause a liquidity shortage at these initially solid funds and induce them to sell off additional assets, which creates a further downward pressure on real estate prices.
on other initially sound institutes may be induced by the effect of real estate market prices on investors' arbitrage opportunities. As has already been noted in previous sections, due to the staggered evaluation procedure the redemption price adapts slowly to declines in property prices. Thus, investors observing a price decline can anticipate a reduction in the redemption rate and realize arbitrage profits by withdrawing shortly before and reinvesting shortly after the devaluation. As the arbitrage profits of investors absorb funds' liquidity, it may even force previously stable funds to sell off property below book value to gather additional liquidity. Anticipating this effect, even those investors who are unable to benefit from the arbitrage opportunity have an incentive to withdraw on a large scale. Indeed, these effects have been emphasized by many practitioners who also pointed to the comparably illiquid and concentrated market for commercial real estate in Germany which makes these spill-overs through asset prices a particularly relevant phenomenon.
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But given the difficulties of private investors in assessing the development of the fundamental value of real estate funds, "informational" spill-overs of an individual fund's collapse might have even more severe repercussions on other funds: Due to the opacity of real estate funds' assets, investors dispose of only imprecise assessments of future returns and default probabilities of individual funds. However, given that the portfolio structures of different real estate funds are in general very much alike, investors know that it is rather unlikely that a shock affects only a single institution. Thus, the collapse of one real estate fund serves as an indicator for investors holding shares of other real estate funds. Consequently, observing that one fund is unable to redeem its shares, other funds' shareholders trying to extract information from this observation will revise their expectations about the soundness of their fund, which might increase their incentive to withdraw. Because of the liquidity insurance that open-end real estate funds offer, unexpected large-scale withdrawals can trigger a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis. Even sound real estate funds might collapse simply due to the erroneous change in investors' sentiment following the crisis of an individual fund. Thus, -similar to the mechanism emphasized by Chen (1999) with regard to banking crises -the collapse of an individual fund can trigger informational contagion of large parts of a fundamentally sound industry.
In contrast to this endogenous source of information, exogenous providers of information, such as rating agencies, can be expected to deliver accurate fundamental information about individual funds' business perspectives to the public and hence perform a valuable task in reducing the informational asymmetry between funds and investors. However, whether or not they make the investment decision of shareholders more efficient remains an open question. On the one hand, they may reduce the sensitivity of investors to the fragility of other funds. Disposing of more precise information about each individual fund, investors may rely to a lower extent on the information that they extract from the observed collapse of one fund with regard to the stability of other real estate funds.
Consequently, by diminishing information asymmetries, rating agencies may substantially reduce the risk of informational contagion between open-end real estate funds. Relying on the results of global games theory, however, this finding only holds if the rating information does not become common knowledge among all investors. In the context of real estate funds, this may be a reasonable assumption, since the market for property fund ratings is rather fragmented, and, unlike the market for credit ratings, is not divided among the "Big Three" agencies (Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch). Moreover, as fund-ratings are not publicly announced but usually sold to subscribers, a public dissemination of their content, for instance in the newspapers, will solely follow an extreme rating assessment that naturally leads to a response in the financial press. If, however, the rating information does become common knowledge, the rating's effect may be similar to the impact that credit rating agencies have been found to have on firms issuing debt. Focussing solely on the coordinating role of ratings due to their high degree of publicity (in credit markets), Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) have shown that the existence of a rating agency may lead to a reduction of uncertainty in investment behavior, as it becomes easier for investors to anticipate the aggregate market outcome. In their model, the existence of a rating agency therefore contributes to the prevalence of a unique equilibrium. However, as Carlson and Hale (2005) show, ratings do not only coordinate behavior but also bring new informational content to the market. They conclude that by simultaneously fulfilling both a coordination and an information function, rating agencies may increase market uncertainty as multiple equilibria become more likely. Both papers, however, lack a proper utility function for the rating agencies and simply assume that they always try to generate a rating that reproduces the unknown credit quality as precisely as possible, thereby maximizing the agencies' reputation.
In a recent paper, Bannier and Tyrell (2005) show that these earlier results do not necessarily hold if a more complex utility function for a rating agency is introduced. In particular, they assume that a rating agency not only tries to maximize her reputation but also has to take into account competitive pressures from other information providers and has to account for a potential feedback effect of her rating on the credit quality of the rated firm. These arguments seem to hold for the ratings of property funds as well. In the real estate market, competition between rating agencies is particularly fierce as market entry is not as strictly regulated as in the market for credit-ratings. Due to strong com-plementarities in investors' behavior following from the liquidity transformation function that open-end property funds offer, potential feedback effects from a fund's rating on its liquidity situation and hence on its future business prospects are particularly obvious.
As has been shown by Bannier and Tyrell (2005) , rating agencies that generate ratings taking into account the above-mentioned utility arguments may potentially but do not necessarily increase market uncertainties. While a rating announcement automatically increases the precision of public information on the market and hence raises the risk of self-fulfilling crises, these may be prevented if investors have access to sufficiently precise private information. However, as has already been mentioned, for the case of open-end property funds this possibility is limited at least for private investors who were the main target group for these funds. In this market, therefore, the existence of ratings, provided that they become common information to all investors, may reasonably increase market uncertainty and trigger inefficient fund closures. The more precise the rating is, the easier it becomes for investors to coordinate their actions, which increases the effect. This result is strengthened by an interesting feature of fund ratings. While usually ratings simply assess the quality of the fund's underlying assets on a relative scale, there are ratings that additionally combine this quality assessment with a sell, hold or buy recommendation.
The latter combined type of ratings will certainly ease investors' coordination based on the published rating, as such increasing the risk of self-fulfilling crises.
An additional result by Bannier and Tyrell (2005) refers to the impact that the market segregation between private and institutional investors has on a rating's influence. Usually, institutional investors are required to invest only in assets or funds that are perceived to be sound, i.e. in "investment grade" assets or "mündelsichere Anlagen". These investment constraints for institutional investors can be shown to increase the probability of a crisis, i.e. of an inefficient mass withdrawal of money, where the effect is strengthened by the relative size of their investment. Combining the demise of the KanAm funds with the closure of Deutsche Bank's Grundbesitz Invest, we find that the former was definitively not triggered by fundamental reasons. In particular, KanAm US-Grundinvest was the most successful open-end property fund in Germany at the time. It stands to reason therefore, which role the publication of the negative rating assessments played for the observed development of KanAm's funds. The fact that the Scope ratings were combined with a sell recommendation -a rather unusual proceeding -certainly contributed to the high perceived precision of this piece of public information.
The Spread of the Crisis in Germany
This perception of a high precision of public information about the KanAm funds' quality might exactly have been what triggered the crisis. As the KanAm funds did not seem to be in a range where a crisis was inevitable, an interval might have opened up where self-fulfilling crises became possible. Since it is hardly possible to obtain any precise private information about the investments of real-estate funds, the perceived increase in public information precision due to the rating announcement might reasonably have triggered the possibility of multiple equilibria. Within the interval where self-fulfilling prophecies decide on the market outcome, Scope's negative information coordinated investors on the inefficient decision to withdraw their money, which forced the closure of the fund. Obviously, therefore, investors overreacted to the negative rating that was publicly available rather than searched for additional sources of private information. This overre-action reflects the dual role that public information seems to play on financial markets due to strategic complementarities in investors' decisions. On the one hand, it conveys informational content, on the other hand, however, it also coordinates investors' behavior.
As long as public information is sufficiently accurate, the latter effect might not distort the market outcome away from the efficient action that investors would have chosen had they perfectly known the true fundamental value underlying the fund. However, if public information is incorrect, it may coordinate behavior towards an inefficient market outcome. In the case of Scope's rating, information was certainly not very accurate as it was only based on rumours and publicly available pieces of information and not on a thorough analysis of the funds' data, even though it might have been perceived to be quite precise as it was combined with a straightforward trade recommendation. The results were aggravated by the fact that in particular institutional investors seem to have been heavily invested in KanAm's funds and massively withdrew their money after the rating announcement. Certainly this contributed to further withdrawals also by private investors that finally led to the closure of the funds.
Policy Recommendations
After With regard to the control of liquidity, funds have been recommended to increase the level of their liquidity reserves, to introduce a period of notice for large sales (above one
Mill. EUR) of the fund's shares combined with a discount on the redemption of shares from institutional investors, to allow for transactions between various funds owned by one company and to support the public trading of shares on a public exchange once a fund is closed. According to the logic that we followed in section 4.2 of this paper, an increase in liquidity requirements for real estate funds should be seen as counterproductive. It not only reduces the returns that these funds can generate, but it also undermines the disciplining effect of liquidity risk on the fund's management. However, larger liquidity buffers may alleviate the risk of a run on the fund: Higher liquidity reserves will reduce the trigger of the fund's perceived value up to which investors will decide to sell their 18 On January 24, 2006, BVI published a whole package of measures believed to be necessary to improve the funds' operations.
shares.
A discount on the redemption of large shares, i.e. from institutional investors, should be efficiency enhancing because the liquidity transformation provided to investors can be improved (Diamond (1997) ). Additionally, this measure strengthens the incentive of institutional market participants to invest in monitoring of the fund, because they cannot rely on withdrawing before small investors do. Most importantly, the discount also limits the scope for arbitrage opportunities for institutional investors in anticipation of a devaluation of the redemption rate.
Finally, the closure of a fund may only be efficiency enhancing if management is dismissed. Otherwise, the suspension of convertibility of shares into money or the creation of a mutual insurance system eliminate the disciplining effect of liquidity transformation.
These measures might be counterproductive if they reduce financial fragility, which is necessary for giving the right behavioral incentives in a complex institutional financial environment like Germany, by too much. While a trade of shares on public exchanges in the case of a closure of the fund should solve this problem, it has been found that the few burses that allowed for trading of open-end property funds stopped trading once the funds themselves were closed.
Regarding the frequency of evaluation the proposals recommend a shortening of the period in which each unit has to be assessed to 6 month. With regard to the question of how to evaluate the funds' assets, policy recommendations ask for a stronger emphasis of a market-based evaluation. Up to now, due to the staggered valuation process, individual assets are evaluated not very frequently. Most of a fund's assets hence enter the evaluation process with an outdated price that is closer to historical costs than to the present market values. Interestingly, recent research by Freixas and Tsomocos (2004) and Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2005) comes to the conclusion that under certain conditions, "book values" might be much better suited to evaluate assets than "fair values". Even though the papers depart from different assumptions about the underlying market structure, both reflect
the working of open-end property funds reasonably well. While Freixas and Tsomocos (2004) argue that book value accounting is preferable if the evaluated entity is supposed to smooth intertemporal consumption, Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2005) find that this is true if the secondary market for the asset is relatively illiquid and claims are long-lived.
Obviously, it will be important to reduce the volatility of the fund's value by not allowing for additional variability brought about by frequent changes due to a marking-to-market evaluation program. However, while a shortening of the evaluation period and a stronger orientation on current market prices limits the scope of open-end property funds to provide intertemporal smoothing it also limits at the same time arbitrage opportunities that arise due to temporary deviations of the redemption price from the fundamental value of the funds' assets.
Yet, shorter evaluation periods and a higher emphasis on market prices also increases the transparency of a fund's fundamental value. Similarly, the proposed increase in the independence of evaluation experts by forcing funds to change the appointed expert every two years should improve transparency. Better information about the fundamental value of each individual real estate fund reduces the risk of informational contagion since investors to a lesser extent rely on information that they extract from another fund's failure.
In addition, greater transparency should also enable investors to exert direct control on the funds management. This would reduce the need for a fragile capital structure that enables investors to vote by feet in case of a bad fund performance.
An additional way to improve transparency is to foster the rating of open-end real estate fund. Particularly solicited ratings might be an efficient way to reduce the risk of informational contagion and improve investors' control of fund managers. But whenever a rating agency does not have access to private information about the fund, as has been the case for Scope's KanAm rating, the rating will only display a coordination function, which raises the risk of a liquidity crisis for the fund. Thus, in contrast to solicited ratings, unsolicited ratings might actually increase the fragility of open-end property funds.
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